In March, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, urged world powers not to forget the Syrian conflict and warned that the new quarrel could increase dissent over Syria in the UN Security Council. But a worsening situation in Ukraine and in Crimea may also have repercussions on the relationship between Russia and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that had been improving since 2012.
Russia and the ICRC have not always seen eye to eye. For a good part of its post-Soviet history, Russia has been part of a deadly armed conflict in its North Caucasian republic of Chechnya, meaning that operational matters dominated the work of the ICRC in the country, having had to negotiate humanitarian access and attempt to minimize harm to civilians. Even after the end of large-scale hostilities, Chechnya remained the elephant in the room between Russia and the ICRC: In 2004 Russia suspended the ICRC prisoner visits in Chechnya. In 2006, an ICRC staff member told the BBC that the organization had yet to receive information about investigations into the killing of ICRC medical personnel that had taken place in a hospital in Chechnya in 1996. In the five-day war with Georgia in 2008, Russia did not let the ICRC access South Ossetia until after the hostilities were over.
Yet, for around two years, the frosty relationship between Russia and the ICRC appears to have thawed significantly. In 2012, Russia contributed funds to the ICRC for the first time, albeit a relatively small sum of 2 million USD. This was followed by a one million USD donation to ICRC activities in Syria in 2013 and an agreement from Russia’s ministry in charge of humanitarian aid, the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM), to cooperate with the ICRC for EMERCOM’s “Civil Protection Academy.” In March 2013, Russia publicly backed an ICRC initiative to observe a daily humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. In October 2013, Prime Minister Medvedev and a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs received Peter Maurer, president of the ICRC, marking the first meeting between the head of the ICRC and Russia’s head of government since early 2008. Maurer was full of praise for the cooperation with Russia, stating that it would be more difficult to work in Syria were it not for Russia’s political influence on the regime. The ICRC, he admitted, was on much better terms with Russia than in the past and was “very keen to develop, to deepen [and] to expand” their relationship. This sentiment was echoed by the head of the ICRC’s office in Moscow, Pascal Cuttat, who stated that Russia and the ICRC had, over the last year or two, made important progress in developing a “strategic dialogue on issues both inside and outside Russia.”
The situation in the North Caucasus has stabilized to the extent that the ICRC could review its operational presence in 2012. For the first time in its young relationship with Russia, the ICRC can currently focus on issues outside Russian territory. In a phone interview, Pascal Cuttat said that the ICRC is invested in building the relationship with Russia as part of their effort for “strategic anchoring” with a number of key states – that is, rallying support with these actors for ICRC causes beyond the operational work. Indeed, Russia has much to offer the ICRC. Cuttat said that the ICRC could not only benefit from the vast experience of its armed forces, particularly experience gained in Afghanistan, but also from Russia’s international political weight. Russia, he pointed out, “sits at a number of tables.”
As Peter Maurer noted in 2013, Russia is also a key player for the ICRC’s efforts in Syria. Being on friendly terms with the Assad regime and other gatekeepers of interest to the ICRC, Russia could help resolve some of the ICRC’s long-running problems in negotiating humanitarian access in Syria. Russia is not only a gatekeeper, however. As a potentially emerging donor, the relationship could help the ICRC to diversify its funds to include more non-Western sources. Diversifying funds and developing its relationship with Russia could also boost the ICRC’s quest for impartiality, neutrality, and universality, important concerns for an organization that is soul-searching about its place in a more diversified humanitarian sector. Indeed, the ICRC’s perceived universal standing could prove a major success factor for its strategic anchoring approach.
On its part, Russia stands to gain from corroborating its publicly stated concern for civilians in armed conflict, countering U.S. allegations that Russia was prolonging the conflict in Syria. Hence, Russia was quick to publicly communicate Maurer’s praise of its support to the ICRC after the 2013 meeting between Maurer and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Pascal Cuttat, for his part, observed that Russia had discovered the value of the ICRC’s causes; it was both willing to uphold the current legal frameworks and to shape the future rules governing armed conflict. “Relationships develop,” he noted, and the ICRC had received a response to their efforts.
Since Maurer’s 2013 visit, the new dialogue appears to have born even more fruit. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to use its diplomatic weight to release abducted ICRC personnel in Syria. Russian EMERCOM hosted a conference on humanitarian demining with the ICRC in November 2013. The head of EMERCOM’s Department for International Affairs features in a video documenting the event, stating that the ministry wishes to develop its relations with the ICRC because it is one of the “few organizations not politicized.” Also in November 2013, the ICRC held a conference with Russian academics on the law of armed conflict and cyberspace. In 2014, a conference on “new wars” and the situation in the Middle East is scheduled to follow. Finally, Russia is taking active steps to promote the ICRC as an employer in Russia’s diplomatic springboard, the Moscow State University for International Relations.
Thus, 2014 may see a further deepening of Russia’s relationship with the ICRC. However, the viability of this renewed relationship may soon be tested. Should the crisis in Ukraine turn into open hostilities, the ICRC will again have to deal primarily with operational issues involving Russian armed forces. Pascal Cuttat could not comment on potential challenges to the relationship because of ICRC confidentiality about operational work. However, past experience suggests that Russia is not keen to be observed too closely, including by the ICRC.