Negotiating humanitarian access: Between a rock and a hard place

PHAP member articles are written by members of the association in their personal capacity. The views expressed belong solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of PHAP or any other organizations with which the author is associated.
11 February 2014

On June 2012, after months of negotiations, the UN and the Government of Syria agreed on a humanitarian plan. Subsequent statements show the bittersweet feelings that the outcomes of the negotiations left. “Comfortable or not comfortable, we simply have to accept the situation, and live with some second best options […] I don’t think as humanitarians you have many other options than persuasion and trust building […] To put it bluntly, we are caught between a rock and a hard place.”1

Humanitarian actors have to negotiate all the time in order to reach those in need. The principles underlying humanitarian action are frequently compromised for the sake of gaining access to populations affected by conflict and disasters. However, the principles of humanitarian assistance are regarded as non-negotiable, which leads to the negotiated character of humanitarian access being often poorly understood.

This article analyzes the main components and characteristics of humanitarian negotiations. It explores their distinct features in relation to other kinds of negotiations and the challenges that emanate from these special attributes, and presents a strategic framework for humanitarian negotiations. In doing so, the aim of the article is to increase the understanding of the nature of humanitarian negotiations, and to point to ways to overcome the challenges associated with such negotiations.

 

Elements of humanitarian action

Elements: What is negotiated – Humanitarian action and humanitarian access

Humanitarian action has two dimensions: assistance and protection. Assistance refers to the provision of goods and services to meet the physical, psychosocial, and socioeconomic needs of affected persons. Protection, on the other hand, focuses on ensuring that the behavior of parties to the conflict is consistent with obligations under international law. Humanitarian actors require humanitarian access to be able to deliver assistance and ensure protection. Frequently, academia and practitioners also use the term humanitarian space, referring to both the physical environment and to the room for maneuver of humanitarian workers to operate without fear of attack and interference by parties to the conflict.2

Humanitarian access is normally achieved – and maintained – through negotiations with a variety of actors, each with its own interests. Humanitarian negotiations can be defined as a process of carving out a space for discussion and engagement  to ensure the protection of vulnerable populations and to preserve humanitarian space for the delivery of assistance.3

Depending on whether the primary focus is protection or assistance, the roles of the humanitarian actors and armed groups will differ in certain ways. In the case of negotiations on protection issues, there is a positive obligation on the parties to the conflict. The role of the humanitarian actors typically entails monitoring compliance, raising awareness, and building technical capacity of the parties so that they can fulfill their obligations. During negotiations, the humanitarian actors have little scope to maneuver or compromise, as the boundaries for negotiation are formed by international law. In contrast, in the case of assistance-related negotiations, the main agent in charge of implementing the outcome of the negotiations will normally be the humanitarian organization, while the role of the fighting parties will be to facilitate the assistance. Although international law also obliges parties to allow humanitarian assistance to reach populations in need, in practice this obligation is subject to a broad scope of interpretation.4

Elements: Who negotiates – Parties to the conflict and humanitarian actors

In an armed conflict, humanitarian negotiations take place between humanitarian actors and “parties to the conflict.” There are two main types of parties to a conflict: state armed forces and non-state armed groups.

Parties to the Conflict: Non-State Armed Groups
Currently, almost all active conflicts occur within states and involve non-state actors.5 Because conflicts last longer, groups often also fraction and transform, presenting a very complex landscape of actors. Armed groups’ composition and lines of command are increasingly less well defined. Some groups, like Al-Qaeda, have horizontal, networked, and overlapping structures that operate across countries, which make the identification of valid interlocutors almost an impossible task.6

Problems transcend the operational level. The complex legal and political nature of armed groups makes engagement with them extremely problematic. Although international humanitarian law (IHL) recognizes armed groups as subjects of duties, national legislation, without exception, treats armed groups acting on the territory of the state in question as illegal structures threatening the state’s stability. In Colombia, for example, the government has repeatedly denied the existence of an armed conflict and has insisted on the solely criminal nature of the armed groups. In this context, the Colombian government has categorically refused to authorize humanitarian agencies to establish any dialogue with the armed groups. Such pressure may also come from governments other than that of the state where the conflict takes place. Some governments, like that of the US, have aggressively sought to criminalize any engagement with specific armed groups through counter-terror legislation.7

Parties to the Conflict: The Government
A government party to an armed conflict has a dual role. As a belligerent party, it is subject to the obligations of IHL. At the same time, the government is also the primary responsible for the lives and wellbeing of its population, irrespective of their location or political affiliation. Since the former role often leads to governments being unable or unwilling to fulfill the latter role, there is an international consensus around the important role of neutral and impartial agents external to the conflict in the provision of humanitarian assistance. This means, however, that humanitarian action involves an act of substitution of the host governments’ responsibilities, which governments are frequently unwilling to accept or recognize.

Furthermore, governments are also responsible for the security of the international humanitarian actors.8 However, protective state arrangements for aid agencies can actually increase insecurity due to perceptions of partiality and can increase the risk of humanitarian actors becoming the victims of collateral damage or targeted attacks by armed groups. This frequently creates tensions between humanitarian actors and host governments.9

Humanitarian Actors
Humanitarian actors encompass a wide range of entities with different objectives, principles, and modi operandi. No individual humanitarian organization can meet all needs in emergency situations and, therefore, the diversity of humanitarian actors is an asset to the humanitarian community. However, when sitting at the negotiation table, the variety of approaches can substantially weaken the standing of the humanitarian community in the negotiations.

In recent decades, there have been some efforts to establish a more coherent approach, for example through the establishment of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the ”cluster approach,” and the introduction of the Humanitarian Reform10 and the UN Integration Policy11. These recent developments, however, show mixed results. The main critique stems from the perception that these reforms – particularly the Integration Policy – erode the neutrality of humanitarian action and lead to the subordination of humanitarian concerns to political imperatives.12

Elements: Why negotiate – the interests in humanitarian negotiations

Interests are the desires, concerns, needs, and fears underlying the positions presented by the parties in negotiations. Interests are broader than positions: while the latter is something a party has decided to present as their stance, interests are what cause parties to make such a decision.13

Humanitarian actors are supposed to be guided by the principles of impartiality and neutrality. This, however, does not mean that they are neutral in negotiations. Humanitarian actors engage in a negotiation process not as mediators, but as negotiators, with their own sets of interests and goals. They are part of a negotiation mainly to represent the needs and interests of the population affected by the conflict, although it would be naïve to ignore that humanitarian actors also have their own interests vested in the negotiations.

Because humanitarian crises are increasingly created for strategic reasons to manage threats and governability deadlocks, humanitarian actors’ interests will often be directly opposed to those of the parties to the conflict. Moreover, it should not be assumed that winning the war is always the primary interest of all parties. In countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leona, and the Central African Republic, war has become a profitable modus vivendi for many, parties may be more interested in preserving the status quo to regularly obtain their share of wealth, than reaching a political settlement.14 The main interests of governments and non-state armed groups will be intimately linked to their military and political activities and aspirations. While these aspirations are often at odds with humanitarian objectives, humanitarian aid can sometimes also be perceived as a way of advancing both internal and international legitimacy. In the current cosmopolitan world, wars are likely to be strongly influenced by the perceptions of the international community, although the effect varies tremendously across contexts. In Libya in 2011, the international community´s support of the rebel groups strongly influenced the course of the events. Armed groups like the Sudan People Liberation’s Army (SPLA) in Sudan have been mindful of the importance of international support to realizing its aspirations for self-determination. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) always portrayed themselves as “freedom fighters” or “liberators,” and in anticipation of the post-conflict situation, the KLA was actively involved working with humanitarian actors. In contrast, other groups, such as Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda have cared little about their international image.

Parties’ interests may be entirely different in each setting. The analysis, however, leaves at least two overarching lessons. First, although it is almost impossible that the interests of humanitarian actors and parties to the conflict will be the same, they can overlap in certain areas and even run in the same direction. Second, even when humanitarian actors should avoid engagement in political affairs, they will need to conduct a political assessment of the parties´ interests to find ways of making those interests compatible with their own.

 

Characteristics of humanitarian negotiations

Characteristics: Legal and moral foundation

IHL provides humanitarian negotiations with a legal framework that most other negotiations lack.15 Humanitarian action is based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence, which are core principles enshrined in IHL, as well as neutrality, transparency, having a participatory approach, and respecting the do no harm principle.16 The legitimacy of humanitarian action lies in the supremacy and clarity of these principles and in their universal acceptance. Its legitimacy is not only legally but also morally grounded, as it emanates from the common feeling humans have when confronted with suffering: help those in need. In practical terms, IHL and the humanitarian principles help frame humanitarian negotiations by providing a source of guidance for developing options, and by defining the limits and boundaries within which to seek agreement during negotiations.17 The moral and legal foundation has, however, a flip side to the coin, as will be discussed next.

Characteristics: Negotiating the non-negotiable

International law imposes obligations on states and non-state entities, which in principle are immutable. However, awareness of and respect for legal provisions governing humanitarian assistance vary considerably across different contexts, and parties to the conflict frequently violate their international obligations. This creates a paradox whereby humanitarian actors find themselves negotiating in practice that which is non-negotiable in principle.18

This has a number of practical consequences in negotiations. First, because of the non-negotiable character, humanitarian actors often perceive that they do not have much room for generating alternatives. Second, compromise is less acceptable: even the second best alternative may be an ethically dubious outcome of negotiations. The reality, however, dictates differently. Humanitarian negotiations frequently require compromise, which often leads to controversial decisions.

Characteristics: Negotiating urgent and dramatic stages

Humanitarian action can separate life from death. As a result, perceived stakes in any humanitarian negotiation will be high, at least by humanitarian actors. Because an agreement will in most cases be the only way to effectively reach those caught in the conflict, humanitarian actors will face negotiations without an essential strategic negotiation tool: a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).19 Similarly, humanitarian negotiators will be less likely to reach their “reservation point,” at which the negotiator would walk away from the table rather than reaching an agreement.20 This situation limits the leverage of humanitarian actors, who may feel under pressure to commit to something.

Time is also a key factor. The urgency of humanitarian action and the difficulties in anticipating humanitarian crises mean that humanitarian negotiations take place immediately following disasters or eruptions of violence.21 In this context, humanitarian negotiators will have limited time for consultations to discuss options and to build consensus with key stakeholders. However, even though agreements will be difficult to reach, deferring negotiations to a more suitable moment will often be unacceptable.

Deadlines can have a positive effect on negotiations by providing an external constraint, formalizing time costs, and defusing costly stalling tactics. However, such deadlines must constitute, in order to be effective, a “jointly recognized or accepted ultimatum.”22 This is seldom the case for the parties to the conflict, which are frequently aware of the imbalance and use it to their advantage.

Finally, humanitarian negotiations entail a high level of stress, which has a severe impact on decision-makers’ capabilities. Stress reduces the span of attention and produces cognitive rigidity and inability to cope with complexity. Moreover, negotiators in crises tend to assign very high value to achievements in the present, while heavily discounting the value of alternatives in the future.23

Characteristics: Negotiating without sticks

Humanitarian actors negotiate from a legal and moral high ground, but they lack enforcement mechanisms. Although they can offer some incentives by improving the image of the parties, humanitarian actors negotiate from a relatively weak position: they lack weapons, they do not control the territory, and they cannot impose sanctions. At times, the UN has explored conditionality and “carrot and stick” approaches. However, such approaches are ethically questionable when they restrict aid from being delivered in order to obtain broader concessions. In any case, UN conditionality approaches have not been successful due to the fact that it only binds UN agencies, and therefore it does not prevent other non-governmental organizations or states bilaterally to continue the provision of aid.24

Humanitarian actors can use smart advocacy to push governments to recognize and undertake their responsibilities.25 Smart advocacy has proven effective in countries like Colombia, which has obsessively pursued the task of cleaning up its image of a narco-paramilitary state. However, when working with “rogue” states like Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, the impact of “naming and shaming” may be limited and even counterproductive, as it may pose a risk to humanitarian actors already on the ground and their ability to engage constructively with the government.

Whereas humanitarian actors may not have sticks, others around them might. For example,  “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions” is a war crime, and it can be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).26 However, the effect of ICC decisions on the humanitarian space is subject to vivid debate.27 Bilateral diplomatic action can also be effective, as shown, for example, by how the extensive involvement of diplomats from NATO countries was critical in securing refuge for Albanian Kosovars in Macedonia in April 1999.28 However, humanitarian actors sometimes regard these interactions as a risky gamble that may compromise their perceived neutrality and impartiality and further erode the humanitarian space.29

 

Strategies for negotiating humanitarian access

Strategies: Basing negotiations on interests

Interests are in the majority of instances the most important factor in a negotiation, as they are the ultimate motive for negotiation and thus inform any final decisions that negotiators make. Interests are, however, frequently obscured and not explicitly stated. Investing time and energy in understanding the motivations and potential overlap or compatibility of interests allows negotiators to move beyond stated positions, which are narrower and provide little room for generating alternatives. The example below, adapted from Deborah Mancini-Griffoli and André Picot’s handbook on humanitarian negotiations, illustrates the different possible outcomes of a negotiation depending on whether the negotiation is based on positions or interests.30

Strategies: Leverage and compatibility

Negotiation analysis must also consider negotiators’ relative power perceptions, which will determine their leverage.31 In contrast with the ability to satisfy the other party’s interests, leverage derives its force from a party´s ability to move another party in an intended direction –even if against its interests – based on imposing costs in case they do not enter into a negotiated agreement.32

Depending on the compatibility of interests and the degree of leverage, humanitarian actors should approach negotiations differently. The higher one of the elements is, the less of the other will be required, in principle, to achieve an agreement. Using the model of Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, the matrix below defines possible approaches and strategies to negotiation according to these two variables.33

If negotiations start in the high leverage-high compatibility quadrant (I), negotiations will be simple, as parties will feel not only attracted but also compelled to agree, with negotiators simply having to plough and keep going, like a cart horse. If the compatibility is high and the leverage is low (quadrant II), negotiators will have limited capacity to put pressure on the counterpart, and as result, they will have to rely on persuasion and charm, as a purring cat does. If negotiators enjoy the luxury of leverage but have low compatibility of interest with their counterparts (quadrant IV), they will insist on their terms exerting pressure on the other party, being as stubborn and imposing as a determined elephant. Finally, quadrant III will be the uncomfortable low leverage-low compatibility square, where a negotiator will have little choice but to denounce and attack aggressively like a wolf. As discussed, while humanitarian negotiators may have some capacity to satisfy the interests of the parties to the conflict, they will have limited –- if any — capacity to exert coercion. As a result, humanitarian negotiations will normally take place in the two lower quadrants of the matrix.

Strategies: Changing leverage and compatibility - Persuasion and denunciation

Leverage and compatibility of interests are neither fixed nor given; it is for the humanitarian negotiators to allow the negotiation to move to different quadrants. To do so, humanitarian negotiators can employ two different strategies: denunciation to move to the upper quadrants, and persuasion, to relocate the negotiations in the right hand quadrants.

Traditionally, humanitarian negotiations have preferred persuasion strategies, seeking to make interests compatible. By negotiating through persuasion, humanitarian actors hope to convince parties not only on rational grounds, but also by a process of socialization in which parties to the conflict will increasingly feel compelled to accept the norms and rules of the game.34 Humanitarian negotiators can attempt to identify receptive officials and make individual approaches that will open the path towards cooperation and ultimately towards an agreement. Negotiations based on persuasion are frequently conducted with a promise of confidentiality, which adds an attractive incentive to the parties to the conflict not keen on having international actors disclosing information about abuses committed. In return, humanitarian actors can obtain first-hand information from victims and witnesses, which allow them to better assesses and meet the humanitarian needs on the ground.35 It has, however, a tremendous disadvantage, as it requires what humanitarian negotiators feel they lack: time.

Attempts to make interests converge do not always work. In these circumstances, denunciation and loud advocacy as a means of increasing leverage may be the only realistic strategy for gaining access to the affected population. This strategy is normally sought through the involvement of third parties, such as media, other governments, or international organizations. Denunciation has the advantage of being faster and less costly than persuasion. However, it poses the risk of antagonizing the parties, burning bridges between parties, and prompting officials to close ranks and join forces to rebuff criticism. The risks are particularly severe given the dual role of humanitarian actors as both negotiators and subsequent implementers of an eventual agreed outcome. As implementers, humanitarian actors’ capacity to effectively deliver assistance will hinge on the goodwill of the authorities concerned. The situation may be different for the protection dimension, which, as discussed above, focuses primarily on seeking commitments from the fighting parties to refrain from certain types of action.

The effectiveness of both strategies will frequently depend on the political climate, and on the sensitivity of the parties to the conflict to internal and external perceptions. Persuasion and denunciation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but frequently used to complement each other. In fact, denunciation is in most cases not a strategy for reaching an agreement per se, but a means, often considered as a last resort, for either reframing the negotiation under terms wherein reaching an agreement is feasible, or for walking away from the negotiations without losing the moral high ground.

The willingness of humanitarian negotiators to use one strategy or another will depend on a number of factors, including the mandate of the organization and the specific country context where negotiations are taking place. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, is the humanitarian player that practices the strictest form of persuasion.36 UN agencies, in contrast, will tend to be more vocal. Complementarity can also come from engagement of different entities, with NGOs like Human Rights Watch operating exclusively in the advocacy domain. Additionally, humanitarian actors may use different strategies at different levels. Frequently, denunciation is done at headquarters rather than by the in-country teams, to avoid exposing the latter to the political and security risks that denunciation normally involves.

 

Final remarks

The days when it was enough for humanitarian actors to simply invoke moral and legal obligations without referring to geostrategic and political considerations, if they ever existed, are long gone. While moral and legal arguments can still play an important role in negotiations, the expectations stemming from humanitarian actors´ leverage should be put into a more realistic perspective.

In the absence of leverage, humanitarian actors’ ultimate aim in a negotiation should be to persuade the parties that the potential strategic costs of facilitating humanitarian access are offset by the benefits of granting it. Persuasion will be effective as long as humanitarian actors are capable of presenting options at the negotiation table that render the interests of both humanitarian actors and parties to the conflict compatible – even when they are different.

However, humanitarian actors’ ability to generate options is far from unlimited. Frequently, humanitarian goals will be perceived by the parties to the conflict as subversive. In this context, humanitarian negotiators should be prepared to resort to strategies that force belligerent parties to accept an agreement even if against their perceived interests, including through the interaction and engagement of political actors. How to do that without compromising the humanitarian principles and losing the moral ground remains perhaps the biggest challenge of humanitarian negotiations and of the humanitarian action in general.

The conditions under which humanitarian actors operate have increasingly become more challenging. As a result, the claim that the humanitarian space has shrunk has, over the past decades, become a common refrain among humanitarians, donors, politicians, and other stakeholders. However, humanitarian space should not be seen as a given immutable sphere, into which relief organizations are arbitrarily authorized or not by rebels and governments. Instead, it should be conceived as a domain which humanitarian organizations have the responsibility to claim and defend.

Although humanitarian action will always be surrounded by ethical dilemmas, accepting its negotiated nature will make concessions and trade-offs acceptable, and may release it from some of the criticism under which it has recently been. Partial achievements in humanitarian negotiations will still result in lack of protection and death of many. But at the same time, such achievements will help alleviate suffering and allow for progressively greater access to those in need.

 

About the author

Soledad Herrero has extensive working experience in protection issues, human rights and legal reforms, and humanitarian affairs. She has worked for nine years in UNICEF, serving in the Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean, in the Colombia Country Office, and as Head of Field Office for the new border between Sudan and South Sudan. Soledad holds a Juris Doctorate and a Business Administration from University of Comillas, ICADE (Spain), an LLM from University of London (UK), and a Master on Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Relations (SAIS).

 

Notes

1 Claus Sorensen, Director-General of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), quoted in IRIN (8 June 2012), "Analysis: Principles or pragmatism? Negotiating access in Syria."
2 Humanitarian access is sometimes referred to as “negotiated access”, a concept that was pioneered in 1989 with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which aimed to facilitate assistance to war-affected populations in Sudan. Negotiated access was soon being applied to war-affected populations in Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia. See UN OCHA (2004), Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
3 Mc Hugh, Gerard and Manuel Bessler (2006), Humanitarian Negotiation with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners, United Nations, p. 5.
4 Rule 55 of Customary IHL states: “The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control.”
5 Hofmann, Claudia and Ulrich Schneckener (2011), "Engaging non-state armed actors in state-and peace-building: options and strategies," International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 883, pp. 603-621.
6 Piazza, James A (2009), "Is Islamist terrorism more dangerous?: An empirical study of group ideology, organization, and goal structure," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 62-88.
7 For an analysis of the different normative frameworks see Modirzadeh, Naz, Dustin A. Lewis, and Claude Bruderlein (2011), "Humanitarian Engagement Under Counter Terrorism: a conflict of norms and the emerging policy landscape," International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 883. Some scholars, have argued that the legitimization of "terrorist" groups through talks can be a means to transform a conflict away from violence, see Toros, Harmonie (2008), "We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts," Security Dialogue, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 407-426.
8 In the case of UN bodies, most countries are part of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which places specific responsibilities on the host governments.
9 Egeland, Jan, Adele Harmer, and Abby Stoddard (2011), To Stay and Deliver: Good practice for humanitarians in complex security environments, Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB), UN OCHA, p. 34.
10 The purpose of the Humanitarian Reform is to strengthen the coordination, to provide predictable leadership, and to ensure adequate, flexible and predictable humanitarian financing. UN OCHA (2005), The Four Pillars of Humanitarian Reform.
11 The Integration Policy was formally adopted between humanitarian, political, and peacekeeping UN, to “maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response.” See The Secretary-General’s Policy Decision No. 2008/24.
12 Jackson, Ashley (2012), "Talking to the other side: Humanitarian engagement with armed non-state actors," Humanitarian Policy Group, p. 3.
13 For more about principled negotiation based on interests see Fisher, Roger and William L. Ury (2011), Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in, Penguin Books.
14 Collier, Paul (2000), "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Mats Berdal and David M Malone (eds), IDRC.
15 Slim, Hugo (2002), "Not philanthropy but rights: The proper politicization of humanitarian philosophy," International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1-22.
16 The guiding principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality were adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 46/182 (19 December 1991). See Mc Hugh and Bessler (2006), p. 27.
17 Mc Hugh and Bessler (2006), p. 36.
18 Mancini-Griffoli, Deborah, and André Picot (2004), Humanitarian negotiation: A handbook for securing access, assistance and protection for civilians in armed conflict, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,  p. 11.
19 For more on the BATNA concept, see Mnookin, Robert H., Scott R. Peppet, and Andrew S. Tulumello (2000), Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes, Belknap Press, p. 20.
20 Korobkin, Russell (1999), "Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation,” Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 88.
21 In the terms of William Zartman, this means that the conflict is far from "ripe," and there is no "mutual hurting stalemate" among the fighting parties. Zartman, I. William (2001), "The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments," Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 8-18.
22 Zartman, I. William and Maureen R. Berman (1982), The Practical Negotiator, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 192.
23 Hoisti, Ole B (1979), Theories of crisis decision making, p. 20.
24 Toole, Daniel (2001), "Humanitarian negotiation: observations from recent experience," Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, p. 5.
25 Terry, Fiona (2002), Condemned to repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, p. 22.
26 Rome Statute, Article 8.2 (b) (xxv).
27 In March 2009, for example, the Sudanese government decided to expel 13 NGOs from their country, soon after the indictment of the Sudanese Government by the ICC. Pantuliano, Sara, Susanne Jaspars, and Deepayan Basu Ray (2009), Where to Now? Agency Expulsions in Sudan: Consequences and Next Steps, ALNAP and Humanitarian Policy Group.
28 Macrae, Joanna and Nicholas Leader: "Apples, pears and porridge: the origins and impact of the search for ‘coherence’ between humanitarian and political responses to chronic political emergencies," Disasters, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 290-307.
29 Mc Hugh and Bessler (2006), p. 8; Pantuliano, Sara, Susanne Jaspars and Deepayan Basu Ray (2009), Where to Now? Agency Expulsions in Sudan: Consequences and Next Steps, ALNAP and Humanitarian Policy Group, 2009.
30 Example inspired by Mancini-Griffoli, Deborah and André Picot (2004), umanitarian negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, p. 65.
31 Shell, G. Richard (2006), Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People, Penguin, p. 90.
32 Zartman, I. William and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (2002), Power and Negotiation, University of Michigan Press, p. 8.
33 Mancini-Griffoli and Picot (2004), p. 91.
34 Claudia Hofmann (2006), "Engaging Non-state armed groups in humanitarian action," International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 396–409.
35 Bonard, Paul (1999), Modes of Action Used by Humanitarian Players: Criteria for Operational Complementarity, International Committee of the Red Cross, p. 56.
36 Bonard (1999), p. 52.