A time to act: The argument for no-fly zones and safe areas to protect civilians in Syria

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Twenty years ago, as we watched atrocities mount in Bosnia, governments dithered and a hundred thousand people died needlessly in a brutal war of ethnic cleansing. And now, Syria. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has referred to the Syrian crisis as “dramatic beyond description,” and in an unprecedented act, the heads of the UN humanitarian agencies recently issued a joint call to the world’s governments to seek a political solution for Syria, saying, “Enough, enough!”

While nearly every government wishes Assad would go, the fear remains that the opposition might form an Islamic extremist government. The path chosen is one of partial support of the opposition with no real commitment. Ironically, the failure to support the opposition early on led to an even greater likelihood of extremism as outside forces joined opposition forces, which have become more and more fractured and more likely to commit atrocities. The more the international community has dithered, the fewer options it has. Certainly, the US is in no hurry to intervene and no other government wants to become too engaged without US support. One might describe the international community’s approach to Syria as “the policy of waiting it out.”

But waiting it out is not working. In one of the most documented wars ever, more atrocities are exposed every day.¹ Moral and legal justifications for intervention are clearly present under R2P (Responsibility to Protect) doctrine and both the NATO and UN charters – the question is not applicability, but the political will to acknowledge it. National sovereignty is no longer something that states can hide behind. At this point, history is not on the side of bystanders. We cannot wish our obligations away.

The paper will highlight some of the debate concerning no-fly zones (NFZs) and safe areas, and sets out some specific criteria that might be considered in the development of such strategies. It also presents a critical response to both the inaction of the UN and the US and the course of action suggested by some US political leaders, in particular John McCain, that a “safe area” be set up, not for Syrian civilians, but for opposition rebel forces.

Defining a ‘safe area’

It is important to be clear from the outset what is meant in this paper by the term “safe area.” For the purposes of this discussion, a safe area is conceived as:

A strictly designated area where civilians and civilian objects are protected from harm resulting from ground, air, or other attacks by any armed group. The safe area should be protected by a neutral, specially mandated, and trained international force, not otherwise engaged in military action for or against any side involved in the conflict. The only legitimate use of force by the international troops would involve that used exclusively for the purpose of protecting the civilian population in the zone or defending itself from attack.²

Safe areas as a protection strategy

Protection is integral to the definition of the term “safe area.” Linking safe havens and NFZs is crucial. When people are concentrated, they are more vulnerable to attack, especially by aerial forces. In addition to enforcement of an NFZ, there must be a protection component on the ground that has a clear mandate to take action to protect civilians and to defend itself.

Safe zones have never been perfect endeavors. In the vast majority of cases, safe areas have not been entirely respected as neutral territories. They have been violated by armed forces, attacked by ground and air forces, and held under siege.

The safety zone set up in Nanking during WWII was frequently violated by Japanese forces who sometimes raped and further brutalized women, took men out of the zone and summarily executed them, and challenged the foreigners running the zone. While clearly not a perfect solution, and one that was even rejected by Chiang Kai-Shek, the establishment of the zone saved many thousands of lives – according to one account as many as between 200 000 and 300 000 lives.³

Other zones have been less successful, for example, in the case of Northern Iraq. The United States, Britain, and France did not consistently apply the principle of non-violation of the safe zone established there, failing to stop periodic air raids and incursions into the zone by Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi forces, resulting in deaths, arrests, and displacement of the local population. While the United States did evacuate (under some pressure) Kurds who had worked with international NGOs or were connected with US initiatives in the zone, the Kurdish population was essentially abandoned, causing approximately 75 000 people to flee into Iran

One of the most well known failures to protect civilians who sought protection in a designated safe zone took place in Rwanda. French troops had established the safe zone, called Opération Turquoise, in July 1994. By mid to late July, some 1.2 to 1.5 million IDPs had entered the zone, seeking safety from the advances of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). The zone was extremely controversial, as the RPA and some observers saw it as an attempt by the French government, which had already abetted the escape of some of the leaders of the Rwandan genocide from the country, to further protect those who had participated in the genocide. Although French troops left Rwanda in August 1994, many IDPs that had been in the zone remained in the area. On 22 April 1995, during an attempt to force those who had taken refuge in the Kibeho IDP camp to leave, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) began firing into the camp with rifles, machine guns, and even rocket-propelled grenades. It is estimated that there were up to 4000 deaths at Kibeho, many of them infants and children. Seriously outnumbered by the RPF, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers stood down as the massacre occurred in front of their eyes, although an Australian contingent of medical personnel did their best to save lives.⁴

However, even given the massacre at Kibeho, it has been argued that the operation had concrete benefits. Karin Landgren has written that Operation Turquoise – the safe zone itself – “was a rapid and forceful military intervention which, whatever its motivation, had humanitarian benefits. It stemmed the flow of refugees to Zaire, thus saving many lives given the crisis conditions there. […] Operation Turquoise froze the situation at a certain time, after the worst killings had taken place.”⁵

The Balkans provide another example of the limitations of safe areas. The UN-designated safe area of Sarajevo was held under siege for years, during which time some 11 000 civilians were killed or went missing in the city and an additional 56 000 people were wounded. Obviously, Sarajevo could not be considered a true safe area and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did not have a clear protection mandate.

But the tragedy that befell the town of Srebrenica was what convinced many observers that safe areas could never be a viable protection strategy. Srebrenica was attacked and captured by the Army of the Republika Srpska despite its status as a UN-protected area. Men and boys over 16 were killed in a series of summary executions, most of their bodies dumped into mass graves. The Srebrenica massacre is considered the worst massacre in post-World War II European history. Again, however, the failure involved confusion about the mandate and a failure to adequately support the Dutch troops on the ground.

While none of the safe areas in Bosnia were truly safe, it can be argued that Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were relatively safe in comparison and that had there been no safe areas at all, many more civilian losses would have been incurred.

The key point in this discussion is that it was not the creation or existence of safe areas that was the problem, but the failure of NATO allies and the UN to provide the necessary troops, materiel, and financial resources to actually protect them. This reality, combined with a “zero casualty” policy of unwillingness to risk the loss of any troops, has made it impossible to effectively protect civilians.

Who wants to create a safe area in Syria?

Until fairly recently, few observers have suggested the creation of safe areas in Syria, probably due to a) an extreme reluctance to involve ground troops for fear of ending up in an all-out war and b) the fear of failure associated with the very real disaster of the safe area of Srebrenica in Bosnia. But calls for a safe area have increased, at least in part due to the burden placed on NATO member Turkey in providing for the over 100 000 refugees who have entered the country already. 

The most vocal supporter for the creation of safe zones in Syria has been US Senator John McCain. He argues that Patriot and Cruise missiles could be used to defend against air strikes, but adamantly states that there should be “no American boots on the ground.” However, McCain’s definition of a safe zone purports that its primary purpose is the protection of rebel forces, not of civilians. The zone he envisions would serve as a location where the opposition can “organize, operate, govern, and train and equip…and that would be enough to tip the scales.”⁶

In my view, McCain’s safe area concept is not humanitarian in nature. It is not specifically meant to protect civilians but is instead a political/military option meant to turn the tide in the opposition’s favor. Parts of the zone would be under his plan become legitimate military targets under international humanitarian law, while there is a high risk that civilians would be attracted to the zone believing it to be a humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, McCain argues that the safe zone would be useful as a method to prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. This is not a legitimate use of such zones, especially given the military nature of the zones he proposes.

Sharing the view that safe zones could be useful to stem further refugee flows, Mort Abramowitz, US Ambassador to Turkey from 1989 to 1991 (now with the Century Foundation) has said that safe areas would be possible in several strong opposition areas away from Assad’s forces. This would require air cover from Western countries operating in Turkey and Jordan as well as substantial foreign help, part of which would be in the form of money.⁷

A roundtable analysis of various military protection strategies organized by the Center for Civilians in Conflict in February concluded that limited airstrikes and the deployment of Patriot batteries were two relatively low-risk responses to the situation in Syria.⁸ Limited air strikes, with possible targeting of military objectives such as Syrian aircraft on the ground and runways, could reduce the ability of the regime to target civilians from the air but would not proactively stop civilians from being killed, injured, or threatened. This was identified as the best option, limiting unintended harm to civilians due to its “relatively controlled use of force” as long as there was “proper intelligence, planning, advanced civilian harm mitigation priorities, [and] rules of engagement.”⁹ However, given the situation on the ground today, it seems doubtful that limited airstrikes or the deployment surface-to-air missiles would be sufficiently effective tools to protect civilians, unless they were linked to other measures.

Safe areas in Syria: An imperfect strategy in a perfect storm?

David Phillips at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights, recently posited a number of arguments for the establishment of a safe area in Syria, arguing that safe areas would:

• Create a space for refugees to return to Syria. Their return would relieve the political stress and economic burden on Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, which are already inundated with refugees.
• Provide a venue for the Syrian opposition and for a government in exile and create a space where the diaspora could provide support to a more coherent and united opposition.
• Serve as a buffer zone, putting distance between Syrian forces and front-line states.
• Provide an opportunity for the Syrian opposition to be seen as a credible local partner – one that could be trusted to manage a transfer of power.¹⁰

This last point is particularly interesting since Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have taught us that local partners require grass roots support if the international community is to transfer power to them. A lot of work could also be done within the safe area to begin to establish institutions based on rule of law and democratic participation.

Any plans for safe areas would also have to take into account the protection of civilians in non-opposition areas and considerable pressure should be exerted on the opposition fighters to respect international humanitarian law. Obviously, civilian supporters of the government would not accept any peacekeepers perceived to be aligned with the opposition. This is a problem that deserves a great deal of thought – how can the Alawites and other non-Sunnis be protected?

Phillips suggests that safe areas could be set up in Syria's North and East, encompassing Qamishli, as well as in the Jordanian border area near Deraa.¹¹ In a paper on safe areas for Syria published in 2011 by the Syrian National Council, however, it was suggested that the Idlib province in Jisr al-Shoghour, near the Turkish border and Mediterranean shore, was the best potential location for a safe area due to geographical and infrastructural considerations, as well as the general sentiment of the local population and high concentration of defecting soldiers in the area.¹²

Who would participate, who would lead?

The question of who would or could take the lead in protecting any safe area is a critical one. There are many reasons that ground troops sent to protect safe areas should not come from the US, but should consist of troops from a coalition of the willing and with a clarity of purpose that their participation is to protect Syrian civilians and to ensure their right to seek asylum in neighboring countries.

It seems doubtful, given the inability or unwillingness of the UN Security Council to take action (not to mention the historical problems of UN-administered zones), that a UN force would undertake the creation and enforcement of a safe area in Syria.

Instead, it might be that a coalition of neighboring countries with support from members of the Arab League, Britain, and France could function as the designated protection force, with air support provided by the US and other countries, and humanitarian support within the safe zone provided by the UN. Even a symbolic contribution from Arab League countries would be important, as it would lend credibility to a Turkish-led and NATO-authorized mission.

The most likely candidate for providing leadership and troops for a safe area is Turkey, but its troops would need to be backed up and supported by an international coalition of forces under a united command, and it would have to agree to refrain from preventing refugees from seeking safe haven in Turkey or in any other country. Turkey has the second largest army within the NATO alliance and experience of NATO command from Afghanistan. Its air base in Inclirlik is just a few minutes’ flying time from the Syrian border and could serve as the staging ground for a no-fly zone.¹³

Lt. General Andrew Leslie, a Canadian former NATO deputy commander in Afghanistan, says that Canada would be well-suited to help maintain an NFZ. Providing cover for a humanitarian corridor and assisting in command and control operations would not require the use of force, according to him, “at least not in the first instance, though obviously, we’d be prepared to fire on anyone violating a no-fly zone or attacking humanitarian relief operations.”¹⁴

On the other hand, the Chief of the British Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, advised senior military officials that any move in Syria could become a major military operation, even all-out war. “Even to set up a humanitarian safe area would be a major military operation without the cooperation of the Syrians. In Syria, we have to be prepared to go to war.”¹⁵ He may be correct, or he may be not, but he does not address what the outcome might be if the international community does nothing.

The creation of no-fly zones

In order to create an effective NFZ, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of both the political mandate of the operation and the goal of establishing the zone – would it focus on stopping the aerial bombardment of civilians or would it be used as part of an offensive strategy to attack regime forces? This question is more difficult to answer in Syria than in previous crises. For example, a “no-drive zone,” which was feasible in Libya since there was really only one main road that everyone used, is rendered more difficult due to the more complex human and natural geography of Syria.

An NFZ of any type would require, according to many experts, a dismantling of air defenses and would be extremely expensive. There would be a need for constant surveillance of targets, requiring a huge number of aircraft. A US-implemented NFZ would require a large number of F-22s, along with their aerial refueling tankers and Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs), and other support. Furthermore, “hundreds of sorties a day” would be required.¹⁶ The practical problems with establishing an NFZ have been further complicated by the apparent impending delivery of S-300 air defense systems sold by Russia to Syria.

A credible threat of a no-fly zone might be enough to encourage further defection by pilots and officers from the Syrian forces. Britain and France have in the past year said they would consider establishing an NFZ to assist fleeing civilians, but the rhetoric of the American government seems to indicate that it would have to establish and enforce an NFZ on its own – and implies that it would be a very difficult, hugely expensive mission. Its assertions seem to mark the idea as essentially a non-starter.

One dissenter from the cautious US opinion is US Navy Commander Christopher Harmer (retired), who has stated that it would be possible to “seriously degrade the Syrian air force by hitting its aircraft, its runways, and its radar, without putting any US or NATO personnel at risk.” A safe area created in northern Syria could be expanded via the use of aircraft flying along the border and over the Mediterranean Sea, given the fact that US air-to-air missiles have much longer ranges than Syrian missiles.¹⁷

Clearly, however, if Russia is not pressured to stop the transfer of new air defense systems to Assad’s forces, the possibility of a NFZ as part of a safe area strategy is quite likely to be taken off the table.

Conclusion: Proposed criteria for safe areas

In view of the problems with previously established safe areas highlighted in the above examples, the following criteria are proposed:

Protection of the safe area

1. NATO, the UN, or a coalition of the willing must be prepared to commit troops and materiel to the safe area, and these forces must constitute a real deterrent to military attack.
2. Security problems must be clearly identified and potential responses mapped out from the beginning, with designation of clear responsibilities for the protection of the safe area.
3. Specific plans for the defense of the safe area should be agreed and made clear among all parties before relief organizations supply humanitarian aid.
4. Aerial attacks or incursions into the safe area must be dealt with decisively. Those who violate the safe area must be identified and referred immediately to the International Criminal Court for prosecution for any violation of applicable international humanitarian law.
5. The use of Multi-Specialty Units (MSUs), such as those developed in Bosnia and Kosovo, should be considered.¹⁸

Maintaining the humanitarian character of the safe area

6. The safe area must be clearly defined and accepted as a temporary solution with the objective of the immediate protection of human life. 
7. Bases of operation, barracks, and other legitimate military targets belonging to belligerents must not be located within the designated safe area, and offensives must not be mounted from within safe areas.
8. All parties should be informed of the status of the safe area and its protective elements.
9. Care must be taken to preserve the civilian character of the safe area, ensuring that activities within exclude those that could be construed as military in nature.
10. The safe areas must not be used to shield suspected perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against humanity. Those providing security for the safe area should have the right to arrest, detain, and transfer to the appropriate national or international authority such persons, but only with guarantees of due process.
11. The right of people to flee persecution and violence by crossing international borders must be respected.

Protecting civilians and vulnerable groups

12. The protection mandate of any force must include special attention to the protection of special or especially vulnerable groups, including minorities within the zones, older people, vulnerable women, persons with disabilities, the wounded, young children, and pregnant and lactating women.
13. Contingency plans for the evacuation of the population from the safe area, with consideration given to the evacuation of vulnerable groups first, should be developed early in the planning phase, in case the safe area(s) should fall to hostile forces.
14. Special services should be made available and accessible to those who require them.
15. Efforts to identify and contain sites contaminated with unexploded remnants of war (URW) must be undertaken as soon as feasible.
16. The possible negative results of a safe area should be considered early on in the planning. If they occur, they should be well-documented and set in motion changes in the planning to prevent further negative results.

In conclusion, whatever consideration is given to protecting civilians from attacks by Syrian government forces, equal consideration must be given to the protection of Alawite civilians (and other minorities) as well.

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