Aid delivery in Afghanistan: Are military forces really responsible for the deterioration of humanitarian space?

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Much has been written about aid delivery in conflict-affected environments, with particular areas of concern being the shrinking humanitarian space, civil-military interaction, and the blurring of lines between humanitarian and military interventions. In 2009 and 2010 I was the director of ACBAR, a coordinating body for NGOs in Afghanistan. At that critical time for the country, I was ideally placed to observe the behaviour of both humanitarian actors and armed forces and how they interacted. This opened my eyes to the modi operandi of aid organizations and how shifting donor interests can quickly transform the priorities of the humanitarian community working in a crisis.

My purpose here is to share my own observations after nearly nine years spent in one of the world’s most militarized contexts in order to highlight some of the problematic behaviour of humanitarian aid actors. In the Afghan context, where the tough operating environment calls for extreme discipline and consistency, many organisations instead succumbed to short-sighted actions and behaviour, losing track of the longer-term implications for themselves and for the sector as a whole. When humanitarian principles are distorted to the point where they become meaningless, it is time for all actors to take a step back and critically examine the impact of their own behaviour on future humanitarian action.

Principled action: Different interpretations, applied differently

The principles that are supposed to guide the work of humanitarian actors are understood in many different ways. Consequently, they are implemented in many different ways too. However, the ways in which I have seen these guiding principles applied and misapplied has sometimes made me question the intellectual honesty of certain actors and wonder whether they are understood or taken seriously at all.

An example that comes to mind is the fact that numerous aid organizations willingly accepted funding from Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) – funding which was distributed across Afghanistan to support politically and/or militarily motivated projects – while, at the same time, these same organizations were active in delivering relief assistance to victims of the conflict. This provides enough ground to give external actors, such as armed elements or even the beneficiaries of assistance, an impression of confusion, lack of consistency, and in the end a lack of credibility among humanitarian actors.

This kind of extreme flexibility with principles is highly regrettable from an ethical point of view, as it constitutes a breach of the moral contract between victims and aid workers. But perhaps more seriously, and especially important in conflict-affected environments such as Afghanistan, it directly endangers the lives of both civilians and aid workers.

Without a doubt, we need to be realistic and accept the fact that differences of opinion and interpretation between different actors are unavoidable and can potentially even be a healthy sign in a community with diverse backgrounds. But nevertheless, the fact remains that the notable lack of consistency in this domain has concrete and serious effects on the delivery of aid and the possibilities for coordination. As a result, certain actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) tend to feel that that it is necessary to distance themselves from other humanitarian actors by, for example, not being associated with any collective communication initiatives or only having observer roles in coordination forums.

Donor money: Too much, too fast?

The aid community in Afghanistan saw a big shift to a new dynamic after 9/11. From relatively modest budgets during the Taliban regime, numerous aid agencies and international organizations saw their budgets increased by up to tenfold over just two to three years.

This dramatic change should not only raise concerns about how well managed the use of donors’ taxpayers money was but was also accompanied by a rapid shift in the aid community from having a fairly principled – especially in terms of independence and impartiality – and widely respected humanitarian approach to something different.

What exactly has taken the place of this approach is still unclear. Have aid organizations mainly turned into implementing partners of the newly established Afghan government? Are they part of the Western-backed counter-insurgency strategy aiming at dissolving the Taliban in its entirety? Are they reduced to simply competing against each other for funding in a competitive market, based primarily on efficiency with little regard for principles? These new roles are all present, but to different degrees among different organizations.

While this development might be seen as serious enough in itself, it became especially so for those organizations that in this ever-changing landscape tried hard to stay true to their principles. For the ICRC, it was not an easy task trying to explain its approach to representatives of the Bush Administration, who would bluntly reject the concept of humanitarian neutrality.

In the defence of the aid organizations taking on new roles after 9/11, the options for how to rebuild a country devastated by conflict were limited, and donors naturally looked to the aid organizations and agencies that already had experience working in the country. Aid agencies were not forced into these new and bigger roles, often as strategic partners of the newly formed government, but they were definitely strongly “encouraged” by most donor agencies to take them on, starting with USAID and DFID and followed by other NATO Member States supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan

The decision to enter, the decision to stay

Some organizations and agencies may have made a conscious decision to enter this context, taking into account the potential risks for their staff, their beneficiaries, as well as their image. From my discussions with people in different organizations, I know that several were at least aware of the fact that there would be a price to pay for taking on this kind of role. However, many may have just gone with the flow, not really considering the possible long-term consequences.

This might have been an excusable choice in the situation immediately following 9/11 when everyone thought the Taliban regime was as good as gone. It is true that, for nearly three years, Afghanistan enjoyed a period of hope and contagious euphoria. Why adopt a neutral attitude when the “battle against evil” would anyway soon be over?

Once it became clear that the war was in fact not over, all humanitarian organizations and agencies should have suspended a number of projects that were potentially harmful or compromising. The aid providers should have joined forces in order to push for having a Memorandum of Understanding approved by all warring parties that could have defined the conditions under which humanitarian actors could continue to operate in the country.

This was indeed what MSF did before resuming activities in Afghanistan after nearly seven years of interruption, getting a document signed by the three main parties involved in the conflict: the US military commandment, the Afghan government, and the Quetta Shura, represented by the former Minister of Public Health during the Taliban regime. The rest of the aid actors, on the other hand, kept debating the issue while at the same time carrying on with business as usual.

Shifting the blame

It was only when security deteriorated substantially that the humanitarian community in earnest started revising the way they were operating. Even at that stage, they were in general still not truly questioning their interventions. In this confusing atmosphere, military actors who were involved in aid delivery, aiming at “wining the hearts and minds” of the Afghan people, either directly or through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), became an easy scapegoat held responsible for the shrinking humanitarian space.

Most NGOs and UN agencies forgot or refused to even consider that they were in fact actively participating in the implementation of the Counter-Insurgency Strategy supported by the coalition, and that this could be the main cause of the increasing challenges their were facing. It was easier to blame armed actors for their involvement in activities traditionally implemented by aid agencies than to look critically at what the aid community had become in the Afghan context. The underlying issue had in fact little to do with the involvement of armed actors in aid delivery. On the contrary, it was the new role of the aid community and its ambiguous – not to say schizophrenic – behaviour that were responsible for how humanitarian actors in the country were now being perceived.

Supporting reconstruction efforts in a time of peace not only makes sense, but is also an obligation that the aid community bears collectively. However, doing the same in a time of war, and as part of a reconstruction strategy heavily influenced by military objectives, is a whole different story. Aid actors should have acknowledged this unanimously, had they been true to their commitment to basic humanitarian principles.

Refocusing on the underlying causes

Holding armed forces responsible for the radical change in perception of the aid community was not only intellectually dishonest but also prevented most aid organizations and agencies from looking at the true causes of their increasing difficulties to operate. Humanitarian actors have been incapable of taking a step back and assessing their own strategies and actions, and therefore incapable of taking the necessary steps to regain credibility, access, and the confidence of the beneficiaries and conflict stakeholders. The situation has become more and more confusing and chaotic to the point where even the most principled humanitarian actors become a target, as was the case with the attack on the ICRC in Jalalabad in May earlier this year.

I do not in any way justify attacks perpetrated against aid agencies, even if their neutrality has been long gone in the valleys of the Hindukush Mountains. Attacks against civilians, including political activists, cannot be justified at any time. They remain a violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, and as such must be condemned.

However, the aid community must look at what has happened in Afghanistan, and what is still continuing to play out. The time has come to objectively and with honesty draw the right conclusions and make amends. Abraham Lincoln once said that it is in the darkest of times that principles show us the way. That time has come. It is now that NGOs and UN agencies should remember the true meaning of these wise words. Wars and conflicts are unlikely to ever end completely. What we can do, however, is stop repeating mistakes and instead learn from the ones that we have already made.

As I write this article, Syria and Somalia come to mind. The reasons for the conflicts might be different, but the needs are the same, the general drivers of conflict are the same, and the pressures on aid actors are the same. We must not let the smoke of conflict blur our judgement in these crises. Our manoeuvring in the labyrinth of making principled humanitarian action work on the ground will continue to be difficult in a sector which is by necessity diverse. But I hope as a member of this community that we can all strive to better agree on and follow the core principles in our delivery of humanitarian assistance.

About the author

Laurent Saillard is the former Director of ACBAR and Chairman of the Civil Military Coordination Forum for Afghanistan.

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