Re-balancing the civil-military dialogue toward the humanitarian side

Gloria Martinez 28 March 2013

Working in civil-military affairs for the humanitarian sector, I have come to witness the progress that has been made in the way donors approach peace and stability operations. We often refer to the politicization of foreign policy and aid and there is also, arguably, a process of militarization that is slowly but surely creeping up, more obvious in some contexts than others. “Whole-of-government approaches” is currently the buzzword of civil-military coordination. This concept is both promising and unnerving at the same time, and calls for some serious action on the part of the humanitarian community.

At a recent event I heard a British military officer discuss the realization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that providing food security and the development of agriculture was something that could have been considered in Afghanistan. Agriculture will now be added to their toolbox of non-kinetic activities. Had I closed my eyes I could have sworn I was at a presentation by World Vision or Oxfam. A couple of months later I witnessed peacekeepers from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) suggesting that they should acquire the skills and capacity to provide psychosocial support to women and girls who have suffered sexual and gender-based violence. I cringed.

Often, the military response I hear is that they are filling a gap when security does not allow humanitarian actors to operate. This might very well be true and unavoidable in some cases. The operational realities of some of the contexts in which we work are often a far cry from the perfect situations for which we create guidelines and policies. For all the open and frank discussions I have witnessed, and for all the willingness to learn, I have found that the debate that has been taking shape ignores the difficult questions.

The push to build what are called “civil-military capabilities” is driven by the imperative of improving military and political performance in that all-so-common way in which beneficiaries and communities are in practice set aside as passive recipients of our protection and assistance – even when the emphasis in theory is on participation. The current approach to the development of civil-military capabilities needs to be reframed for two reasons: first, because the emphasis on stabilization is changing political decisions and military operations; second, because current legal frameworks need to be reinforced by strong practice if humanitarian action is to retain its raison d’être.

Stabilization operations and the focus on civilians

International forces recognize the value and impact that winning hearts and minds can bring. Working with the local population and authorities contributes to their ability to fight insurgent attacks and create a socio-economic and political environment conducive to stability. This in turn can have an impact on their ability to achieve their own military objectives. As a result, in contemporary armed conflicts in highly politicized contexts, the necessary separation between civilians and non-civilians is disappearing. Strategies aiming at ending civilian support for the war effort or changing the allegiance or resistance of civilian populations can result in direct harm to civilians. Arguments that point to compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) rules (when applicable) as the only way to maximize the protection of civilians, while valid, assume an inherent justice of the rules that suggests they are free from bias from one’s political views. These arguments also assume that all parties to a conflict place a similar value on human life, above narrowly defined military objectives. And as it happens, IHL does not regulate the kinds of non-kinetic activities that are becoming common and that have consequences for both humanitarians and beneficiaries.

If the current trends and terms of the civil-military coordination dialogue led by governments are anything to go by, CIMIC has the potential to divert international forces from the (military) task of providing the security necessary for civilians to operate, to go beyond their military mandate and focus instead on humanitarian activities. International military forces make no secret of the way in which they use aid for military purposes.¹ Notwithstanding the value that civil-military coordination in line with CMCoord principles, not CIMIC,² can have in achieving common goals, a number of NGO reports have highlighted the risks of “militarized aid” that focuses on winning hearts and minds and is conceived as part of pursuing the objectives of the military mission, noting that in some instances civilians and aid workers have become targets of attacks as a result.³

The trend to make overseas development assistance eligible funds available to ministries of defense as part of whole of government approaches to stabilization is not going to change anytime soon. Developing military doctrine places civilian populations at the very center of the conflict dynamics in irregular warfare. And the nature of the hostilities and the scale of the violence perpetrated against civilians are only complicating the humanitarian operating environment. Whole-of-government and holistic approaches are the drivers of the civil-military coordination dialogue I have witnessed, and often it is not difficult to understand the logic of using NGOs and humanitarian actors as military force multipliers (albeit less in the sense implied by George W. Bush for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thankfully).

To make things a bit more complicated, the ‘civil’ in civil-military remains convoluted and under-examined. While the notion of civil-military coordination might have started as dialogue between UN/humanitarians on the one hand and the military on the other, today civil actors include donor government workers, for-profit development actors (which militaries like to refer to as NGOs, too), and a range of private sector companies.

Finding the balance

But donor countries are learning some of the lessons from their own use of non-kinetic activities and “hearts and minds” approaches. Military thinking is evolving quickly, and the US military has come up with a new military manual aimed at preventing civilian casualties in combat. General Petraeus was well regarded for his issuing of directives banning the use of night raids in Afghanistan (probably more because they were alienating civilians, defeating the purpose of winning over the population, but some credit is due nonetheless). Military protection thinking is moving beyond strict IHL protection principles, which is a positive development.

I am not implying that non-kinetic activities have no place as part of a range of tools that can help international forces achieve their objectives. But it is important to recognize that the current rules of war do not reflect the realities of asymmetric conflicts, or even of conflicts between rich, developed powers and developing countries suffering with a legacy of chronic poverty and hardship. The question for me remains, in light of the persistence of some of the problematic comments I hear rather consistently, are the right lessons being learned?

The purpose of the legal principles and rules contained in IHL is that of sparing civilians as much as possible from the effects of conflict, primarily by the implementation of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution when conducting attacks or other acts employing violent means. This does not include non-kinetic activities. There is thus a need to engage in resolving the question about the extent to which the means justify the end, and look at whether the negative consequences of some military non-kinetic activities in fact outweigh the benefits that can be derived from them. No longer should it be acceptable to rely solely on the excuse that, in insecure environments, the lack of an NGO presence leaves a gap the military is only too willing to fill – not least because it serves a mission objective.

Balancing the need for a principled humanitarian response with operational pragmatism has never been so important in the protection of civilian populations from the effects of conflict. Humanitarian actors share an operational space with militaries, and this is not going to change any time soon. But militaries simply do not have the humanitarian, gender, protection, or development expertise to achieve the necessary long-term stabilization. And even if and when they acquire it, the political and military imperatives of the context in which they operate will only serve as a constraint.

Preserving the essence of humanitarian action

Military actors delivering humanitarian assistance is acceptable when it is not used to advance political or military objectives.⁴ This is critically important, not only to ensure the safety of those receiving the assistance (as well as avoiding adverse distinction in the delivery), but also to avoid the blurring of the lines between humanitarian actors and military actors that can lead to a decrease in the security and safety of those performing relief activities.⁵ But IHL does not provide an explicit legal protection for the provision of impartial relief. Stabilization operations and their major reliance on population-centric non-kinetic activities that draw on humanitarian and aid resources have shaken the weak foundations on which civil-military dialogue has been built. The purpose of civil-military coordination is now conflated with the rapid development of whole-of-government approaches. Public narratives often refer to all aid and relief activities as “humanitarian” with little regard for the consequences.

Unfortunately, current attitudes towards civil-military coordination have been shaped by Afghanistan and Iraq. This probably explains the increased interest of the military to engage with humanitarian actors while the humanitarian sector is only slowly withdrawing from what they view as a state of affairs too detrimental to the protection of their independence, impartiality, and neutrality. The original purpose of civil-military coordination, or CMCoord, as defined by the UN, rested on ensuring the essential dialogue and interaction that focused on the maintenance of principled humanitarian action, minimizing duplication, inconsistency, and competition with a focus on communities’ needs. This purpose is often lost in the pursuance of military CIMIC goals in which the mission objectives prevail. Hence there is the need to increase, and set the terms for, dialogue.

Humanitarian actors have much to contribute to the protection of civilians in humanitarian action in this context of legal vagueness, military policy change, and politically charged discourses and justifications. In light of the speed and openness with which militaries are willing to engage, there needs to be a more systematic commitment to setting the terms of the debate. Are we directly or indirectly turning militaries into development actors with guns? What are the lessons to be learned from the rapid shift in military and policy thinking towards addressing the security/development nexus? Surely it is positive to see donors finally being accountable, (sometimes) transparent, and adopting holistic approaches. But how do we make sure that this does not further exacerbate the politicization and militarization of aid? How can the political decision-making process be better informed, and how do we ensure that learning goes down, but also up, the chain? How do/should humanitarian agencies connect field experiences with the work in head offices to maximize opportunities to influence? In essence, the answers must be sought in how the actors can remain engaged rather than in how to disengage.

In some cases there exists, on the part of militaries, a fundamental lack of understanding of their civilian counterparts, and of the necessary division of labor that is implicit in existing guidelines. In a recent conversation with an Indian army general, he pointed to his concern that, according to his reading of UN Guidelines, “the civilians just want to come and take over the military.” After a long, careful discussion, he was assured that his fears were unfounded, although I could still see the skepticism reflected on his face. And I am sure he is not the only one, and will not be the last one either.

Reviewing recently a CIMIC training manual, I learned that the category “NGOs” includes the Olympic Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Nintendo, and Phillips. And principles of neutrality and impartiality were mixed (you will be surprised how many military officers are convinced of their own “impartiality” and “neutrality). Some doctrine documents look like NGO brochures with images of helpless civilians in need on the cover. Other documents are better informed. There is arguably a fragmentation of the many different manuals, guides, training packs, and efforts to bring officers up to speed, the quality of each depending on the level of consultation.

Although the quality of the engagement has been very much decided by personalities and personal beliefs and interests, the humanitarian community has been proactive in seeking to engage with military actors and responding to requests to participate in a variety of events aiming at building civil-military capabilities. Often, the involvement of humanitarian actors is justified based on their level of expertise and knowledge and how this can build on and improve government approaches. While there is usually some awareness-raising regarding humanitarian principles and the role of humanitarian actors, the point is often missed because military actors can, and do, perceive themselves as abiding by those same principles – and also because nothing has been done to date to establish a division of labor that focuses on expertise, functions, capacity, and international legal and policy instruments. Instead, military actors have been shown how the civilian actors have been doing their jobs and what lessons can be drawn from their expertise and experience. In the long term, it is not surprising that humanitarians fear such an approach will contribute to making military stakeholders better development actors rather than highlighting the boundaries.

Concluding remarks

The humanitarian community has long been preoccupied with the risks of co-option, contagion, and trade-offs in the achievement of political goals. And these concerns are not groundless. At the heart of the controversy is the very essence of humanitarian action and the principles on which it is built: humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality. Civil-military coordination will remain controversial, but this can be mitigated by a more comprehensive and systematic engagement that sets the terms of civil-military dialogue, focuses on well-documented lessons learned (ideally not just from Iraq and Afghanistan), and maximizes every opportunity to influence and change. The purpose of humanitarian action needs to remain on the alleviation of pain and suffering as the primary objective, rather than as a footnote to military and political objectives.

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