Myanmar refugees and IDPs: Is democracy bringing dividends to all sectors of society and all ethnic groups?

The top-down approach to democratization, with a former general as President and a scramble to have a share of the resources, made it doubtful that reformers in Myanmar would have a real say and that civil society would be able to advance a bottom-up approach to reform. In anticipation of the 2015 elections, the key issues remain a very tall order: completing the peace process; addressing sectarian and ethnic conflicts; ensuring that the dividends from peace and development are fairly shared and benefit both the plains and larger cities as well as the mountain areas; establishing the rule of law including full access to rights; addressing property rights issues; balancing needs for economic development with social development and environmental protection; ensuring an effective constitutional process fully addressing the extent of decentralization in a federal set up; and redefining the role of the military in society. A fair solution for the Myanmar refugees – tolerated for decades in refugee camps with no rights – will depend on the outcome of this process. Voluntary repatriation would become a viable solution only if the above issues are properly tackled. Circular migration and integration in Thailand for irregular migrants and refugees that may still need protection would become a possible option. This, together with the situation of the Rohingyas, needs to be addressed within Myanmar but also through regional consultations.

Since the initial ceasefire and the start of the political process intending to bring a durable peace settlement, Myanmar, and especially the former capital Yangon, is undergoing a radical change – investment is booming and there is a construction frenzy. However, the country is still marred with three fundamental issues that, if not addressed, may jeopardize the achievement of a lasting solution: the persisting socio-political unrest brought by years of conflict and the disintegration of traditional family and ethnic structures caused by forced displacement, both internal and external, and by growing urbanisation; continuing strife in Kachin; and the situation with the Rohingyas.

The census

Instead of finalising negotiations on a comprehensive peace settlement and focusing on constitutional reform, the post military regime started a piecemeal reform program and organized the first census in more than 30 years. The results of the census may have brought some new data useful for economic planning and development as heralded by the UNFPA, but have failed to address the fundamental problem of inequality among different ethnic groups, potentially aggravating access to fundamental rights. Many in Myanmar believed that the overall population was some 60 million while the census captured only 51 million – missing, possibly, the Rohingyas and some Kachin in areas where the census was not conducted properly.¹

Since independence in 1948, the central government has been fighting ethnically based insurgent groups, and while there is an on-going peace process, based on ceasefire agreements, a comprehensive agreement has still to be achieved. Discussions regarding autonomy remain a critical issue. The decision to maintain the section on ethnicity in the recent census has given rise to suspicions about a government agenda to certain divide ethnic groups for political reasons. For instance, Burmese of Indian descent could decide to declare themselves as Burmans, thus boosting their overall number, while the Shan are divided into 33 sub-groups. The Muslim population, estimated in 1983 at 4%, may have increased in the new census, but the new figure is still falling short of the real number, as Rohingyas are mostly considered as Bengalis. At the same time, issues of ethnicity have been further exacerbated, as illustrated by the President of Myanmar expressing his support for controversial new religion laws, one restricting interfaith marriages (obliging non-Buddhist men marrying Buddhist women to convert).

The organisation of the census has conveniently put on hold political discussions among the different stakeholders. The democratic opposition proposed four-party talks, which were then modified by the Union Parliament into six-party talk (including a Representative of the ethnic groups). The Government then pushed for 12-party talks, possibly aiming at enlarging them further to have more amenable participants. With the reality that the Constitution cannot be changed without the agreement of the military, and the fact that the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is banned by law from running for the Presidency (under the law, individuals married to foreigners cannot run for office), a firmer stance from the opposition could have been expected.

Attention to the demographics should be maintained, in a country with still a large presence of IDPs and refugees abroad. Envisaging early repatriation of refugees or further displacement would remain highly premature if not conceived, for instance, in the context of circular migration. Further discussions within ASEAN (in the perspective of the freedom of movement agreement) rather than following the traditional donors lead could assist in bringing new, innovative alternatives.

Kachin

The issue of Kachin could not be solved by simply ending military rule without addressing the root causes. Its geographic situation surrounded by China and India (with disputed territory with both countries) would suggest that those two neighbours should be included in the discussions regarding this area. China has a clear economic as well as strategic interest in Myanmar and was closely involved with the previous regime. At the same time, the relations between Kachin and the Chinese Province of Yunnan complicate the picture due to the strong ethnic links between the populations of the two areas. China considers separatist movements both domestically and abroad as potentially dangerous for its own stability – even in the case of Crimea, despite sharing strategic interests with the Russians, Chinese reaction was muted. However, China is not against a Union in Myanmar (and autonomous regions exist even in China, even if not necessarily on ethnic grounds) and has always supported a negotiated settlement.

The Rohingyas

The case of the Rohingyas is clearly related to human rights and statelessness. There is a need for more involvement of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and, to a certain extent, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (which should be less preoccupied with possible turf issues in the regions). The Rohingyas’ plight cannot be seen as a bilateral issue between Myanmar and Bangladesh as it also has clear repercussions on security and stability of the regional ASEAN community, with Thailand and Malaysia being at the forefront. An ASEAN common stand on the Rohingyas, together with a more assertive role from the OHCHR, is needed to help find a solution. The international community could help by making direct investments more dependent on progress achieved on access to fundamental rights by all communities.

It is imperative that Myanmar should not be seen as contested ground for Western or Chinese hegemony, but should be seen more in the context of regional cooperation – which would not exclude either China as part of the region nor the West given their links with ASEAN – on development, security, and integration. Converging ASEAN and Chinese foreign policy towards a negotiated solution and constitutional reform would be a step forward in finding a comprehensive solution to the issue of displacement in the country and the region, at a moment when a stalemate seems to have been reached.